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Abstract
This study examines the properties of equilibrium, including the stability, of discrete-
space agglomeration models with social interactions. The 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1 Introduction
Beckmann's (1976) social interaction model has been an important benchmark for the study
on spatial agglomeration. Considering the fact that face-to-face communications are impor-
tant for understanding the mechanisms behind spatial distributions of economic activities,
Beckmann (1976) presented a model in which people aiming to interact with others choose
their area of location, referred to as a cell in this study. Although people can reduce the cost
of interactions by locating close to one another, agglomeration can cause congestion, such
as increases in housing prices. Equilibrium population distributions, which are of interest
to this study, emerge as a result of the trade-o between the positive and negative eects
of agglomeration. This type of model has been of particular interest for urban economists
because the cell of an urban center is not specied a priori, unlike classical urban models
such as the monocentric city model.1
Beckmann (1976) also considered social interactions among households for a linear city
represented by a real line. After Beckmann's (1976) study, Tabuchi (1986) and Mossay
and Picard (2011) considered social interactions among a single type of agent on the real
line.2 All these studies attained symmetric unimodal population distributions as unique
equilibria. This uniqueness result is compelling, and the shape of the equilibrium distribution
is intuitively reasonable. Moreover, this is good news for policymakers since they do not have
to worry about multiple equilibria when internalizing externalities.
Although the results attained in continuous-space models serve as important theoretical
benchmarks, examining whether these results are robust in terms of the discretization of
space is also essential. In particular, if we would like to empirically test the model, we would
have to discretize it. For example, it is virtually impossible to collect population data for
each point. Whatever micro the data is, it is still aggregated over some geographical areas.3
Thus, empirical studies cannot invoke the uniqueness result of the continuous-space model
unless the properties of equilibria of the continuous-space model are transferred to those of
the discrete-space model.
To address this issue, we consider social interactions among consumers in the discrete
space in which a nite number of cells are distributed on a line segment, and we study the
1See, for example, Section 3.3 of Fujita and Thisse (2013).
2Mossay and Picard (2011) considered consumers, whereas Tabuchi (1986) considered rms. Besides
models on the real line, O'Hara (1977) considered the social interactions of rms in a square city, and
Borukhov and Hochman (1977) considered the social interactions of consumers in a circular city. They also
obtained a symmetric unimodal distribution as a unique equilibrium. In Borukhov and Hochman (1977),
though, the cost of social interaction was not weighted by population density, so social interactions did not
cause any externality.
3In fact, Allen and Arkolakis (2014), who studied the relationship between economic activity and geog-
raphy with data, \approximate the continuous space with a discrete number of locations (p. 1113)."
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properties of equilibria accordingly. To this end, this study begins by creating a model for
a general quasi-linear utility function, invoking the fact that this model of location choice
can be described as a potential game (Monderer and Shapley, 1996).4 One important con-
sequence of being a potential game is that the equilibrium can be characterized with a
nite-dimensional optimization problem. Indeed, by assuming that the pairwise interaction
cost between cells is symmetric, we can identify a function, called a potential function, so that
the set of equilibria exactly coincides with the set of Kurash{Kuhn{Tucker (KKT) points
for the maximization problem of the function. Moreover, even if multiple equilibria arise, we
can conduct the stability analysis with the potential function. In fact, every local maximizer
of the potential function is a stable equilibrium under a broad class of myopic individualis-
tic evolutionary dynamics. Note that the stability of equilibria has not been addressed in
continuous-space models.5 The discretization of space reduces the dimension of the stability
analysis, which enables the properties of equilibria to be scrutinized more closely.
We provide both positive and negative results for the issue raised above. Regarding the
negative result, we present cases in which the equilibrium in the discrete space is essentially
non-unique as long as the interaction cost is not too small, meaning that equilibria having
dierent numbers of populated cells coexist. In particular, we can pin down a range of inter-
action costs in which multiple equilibria arise for any nite number of cells. This result holds,
for example, when the equilibrium condition is described as a system of linear equations,
which is particularly relevant to empirical analysis. This also suggests that contrary to the
case of the unique equilibrium, it is important to be cautious about interpreting implications
from the analysis focusing on a particular equilibrium because it is possible that the equi-
librium is unstable and another stable equilibrium with an essentially dierent population
distribution exists.
Conversely, we explore the connection between continuous-space and discrete-space mod-
els by focusing on the linear interaction cost. In particular, we make each cell eventually
non-atomic by increasing the number of cells while the total size of location space remains
xed, and study the limiting properties of equilibria. We show that any sequence of the
discrete-space model's equilibria converges to the equilibrium of the continuous-space model
as the number of cells goes to innity or as the distance between adjacent cells vanishes. Since
the equilibrium of the continuous-space model is unique, this means that the set of equilibria
is continuous in the number of cells at their limit. This is a positive result since we may
4The potential function approach has been recognized as a promising analytical tool for regional science
(Fujita and Thisse, 2013). See Oyama (2009a,b) and Fujishima (2013) for applications of the potential game
approach to geography models.
5Naturally, continuous-space models are not always free from the problem of multiple equilibria, as we
will discuss in the concluding remarks.
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think that as long as the number of geographical zones is suciently large, any equilibrium
of a discrete-space model is close to the equilibrium of a limiting continuous-space model. In
other words, a continuous-space model can be viewed as the limit of a discrete-space model
with regard to the size of geographical zones.
To the best of our knowledge, few papers on spatial social interactions have utilized a
discrete-space model. Anas and Xu (1999) presented a multi-regional general equilibrium
model in which every region employs labor and produces goods. Although the technology
exhibited a constant returns to scale, the goods were dierentiated over regions and the con-
sumers traveled to each region to purchase them, which yielded an agglomeration force in the
central region.6 Although their model was useful for evaluating urban policies, they entirely
relied on numerical simulations, thus forcing us to consider a particular equilibrium that
might be unstable in the case of multiple equilibria. Turner (2005) and Caruso et al. (2009)
considered one-dimensional discrete-space location models with neighborhood externalities
in the sense that utility at a particular location depends on the population distribution
of the neighborhood.7 Caruso et al. (2009) relied on numerical simulations, while Turner
(2005) generically attained a unique equilibrium outcome by considering an extreme type
of neighborhood externalities in which an individual located between vacant neighborhoods
receives a bonus. However, because they focused on the eects of residential locations on
open spaces, they abstracted away from the endogenous determination of an urban center,
although this remains an important feature of the model in which we are interested.8 More-
over, we emphasize that none of the aforementioned works focused on the relation between
continuous- and discrete-space models.
The remainder of this study is as follows. Section 2 introduces a general class of social
interaction models and characterizes this class as a potential game. Section 3 examines
the stability of equilibria and Section 4 investigates the uniqueness of equilibria. Section
5 studies the connections between discrete- and continuous-space models by increasing the
number of cells. Finally, Section 6 concludes the study. Note that the proofs omitted in the
main text are provided in the Appendix.
6Braid (1988) considered a ve-town model having a similar structure, although he abstracted away
from general equilibrium eects. He showed that, depending on the degree of product dierentiation, the
equilibrium rm distribution can be bimodal.
7Caruso et al. (2007) considered a two-dimensional discrete space.
8Moreover, they made the so-called open-city assumption in which the equilibrium utility level was ex-
ogenous, whereas the total city population was endogenous.
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2 The model
We start with a general class of discrete-space social interaction models, which includes the
discrete-space analogue of Beckmann's (1976) and Mossay and Picard's (2011) models as
special cases. This description enables us to illustrate how the potential function approach
generally works for the equilibrium characterization and the stability analysis of discrete-
space social interaction models.
2.1 Basic assumptions
We consider a region represented by the unit interval [0; 1] divided into K cells. The cells
are labeled by i 2 S  f1; 2;    ; Kg in order of distance from 0, where the width of cell i
is denoted by i. The boundary between cells i and i + 1 for i 2 f1; 2; :::; K   1g is then
bi = i+ bi 1, where b0 = 0 and bK = 1. The center of cell i, which is i2 + bi 1, is denoted by
xi.
9 We assume that the land is uniformly distributed, with a density of 1 over the region.
As is common in the literature, the land is owned by absentee landlords. In addition, the
opportunity cost of the land is normalized to zero.
There is a unit mass of identical consumers in this region. Let ni 2 [0; 1] be the mass of
consumers in cell i, and let  
n
n = (n1;    ; nK) 2 RK+ :
PK
i=1 ni = 1
o
denote the set of
consumers' spatial distributions. Each consumer travels to every other consumer for social
interaction. In each cell, they obtain the same utility u(zi; yi) for residential land yi and for
the composite good zi, which is chosen as the numeraire. Given land rent ri and population
distribution n 2 , the utility maximization problem of consumers in cell i is expressed as
max
zi;yi

u(zi; yi) j zi + riyi + Ti(n)  Y; i 2 S
	
; (1)
where ri denotes the land rent in cell i, and Y is the xed income. Ti(n) is the total cost to
consumers from cell i for traveling to other consumers, which is dened as
Ti(n)  
KX
j=1
dijnj; (2)
where dij denotes the travel cost from cell i to j. We make the following assumption
regarding the properties of D = (dij):
Assumption 1 D = (dij) fullls the following four conditions:
9The geometric structure stated here is necessary only in Sections 4.1 and 5. For other places, it is
sucient to state \there are K cells where the area of cell i is i and the interaction cost between cells i and
j, to be dened below, is dij ."
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(i) dii = 0 for all i 2 S;
(ii) dij = dji for any i; j 2 S;
(iii) D is negative denite on T 
n
z = (z1;    ; zK) 2 RK :
PK
i=1 zi = 0
o
;
In the terminology of spatial statistics, the rst three conditions imply that dij is an isotropic
variogram. This class of travel costs includes the exponential cost (dij = e
jxi xj j   1) and
the linear cost (dij = jxi   xjj), both of which are commonly assumed in the literature of
spatial interaction. From an economic point of view, condition (iii), which states that D is
negative denite on the tangent space of , can be interpreted as self-defeating externalities.
Suppose that some players change their cells. Then, under this condition, the improvements
in the interaction costs of cells to which they switch are dominated by the improvements in
the interaction costs of cells they abandon.10
The utility function u(zi; yi) is assumed to be quasi-linear:
u(zi; yi) = zi + f(yi); (3)
where we make the following assumptions on the utility of land consumption f :
Assumption 2 f is strictly increasing, concave, and twice continuously dierentiable. More-
over, limx!1 xf 0(x) <1.
If f(x) =  lnx [resp. f(x) =   
2x
] where  > 0 is a constant, then we obtain the discrete-
space analogue of Beckmann's (1976)[resp. Mossay and Picard's (2011)] model.
Given a population distribution, let us derive the maximum utilities attainable in each
cell. Let population distribution n 2  be given, and pick i 2 S such that ni > 0. Then,
consumers in cell i solve the utility maximization problem (1). Under the quasi-linear utility
function specied in (3), the rst-order condition with respect to yi is
f 0(yi)  ri; (4)
where the equality holds whenever yi > 0. However, since the land market clears, we have
yi = i=ni > 0. Hence, ri = f
0 (i=ni). Then, we dene
h (x) = f
 
x 1
  x 1f 0  x 1 : (5)
10Hofbauer et al. (2009) argued that the self-defeating externalities characterize stable games. In fact, if we
consider a game in which the payo of strategy i 2 S is Ti(n), condition (iii) is the necessary and sucient
condition for the game to be a stable game.
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This represents the net utility from the land consumption in cell i when x = ni=i, which
is the population density in cell i. Since limx!1 xf 0(x) < 1, h is bounded below, but we
allow limx!0 h(x) =1. Given n 2 , the maximum utility attained in cell i is then
vi(n)  ui

Y   Ti(n)  i
ni
f 0

i
ni

;
i
ni

= Y   Ti(n) + h(ni=i): (6)
If nj = 0 for some j 2 S, then we assume that the utility attained is
vj(n)  lim
n^!0
[Y   Tj(n j; n^) + h (n^=j)]; (7)
where (n j; n^) = (n1; :::; nj 1; n^; nj+1; :::; nK). Note that we allow vj(n) =1 for j 2 S such
that nj = 0, which is actually the case in Beckmann's (1976) model.
2.2 Spatial equilibrium and potential game
We will now dene the equilibrium. We consider a two-stage game in which each consumer
rst settles in a cell and chooses consumptions of the composite good and land in his/her
cell. Since we impose the subgame perfection, we argue backwards to characterize equilibria.
However, we have aleady specied each cell's utility levels given n 2  (i.e., fvi(n)gi2S).
Then, in the rst stage, each consumer chooses a cell that provides the highest utility, given
the location decisions of other consumers. Formally, the equilibrium is dened as follows11:
Denition 1 A spatial equilibrium is a population distribution n 2  such that given
n 2 , no one has the incentive to change the cell. That is, there exists u 2 R such that8<:u = vi(n) if ni > 0;u  vi(n) if ni = 0: 8i 2 S: (8)
If vi(n) =1 when ni = 0 for any i 2 S, then only interior distribution can be an equilibrium.
This is the case for Beckmann's (1976) model.
By writing the indirect utilities in a vector form, we obtain
v(n)  (vi(n))Ki=1 = Y 1  T (n) + h(n) (9)
where T (n) = (Ti(n))
K
i=1(= Dn), h(n) = (h(ni=i))
K
i=1, and 1 is a vector of ones with
an appropriate dimension. People prefer to agglomerate to reduce the social interaction
11Strictly speaking, the denition of the equilibrium should state how people choose their allocations at
the second stage. However, we make it implicit here because, in what follows, we focus on equilibrium
population distributions.
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costs, which are summarized by T (n). However, people also prefer to disperse and avoid
the congestion from the land consumption that is summarized by h(n) since h0(ni=i) =
(i=ni)
3f 00(i=ni) < 0. As we will see, spatial equilibrium is attained as a result of tradeos
between the agglomeration force, represented by T (n), and the dispersion force, represented
by h(n).
In what follows, to characterize spatial equilibria and their stability, we invoke the prop-
erties of a potential game introduced by Monderer and Shapley (1996). Note that our model
may be viewed as a game in which the set of players is [0; 1], the (common) action set is
S, and the payo vector is (vi)
K
i=1.
12 Moreover, as is evident from the denition, a spatial
equilibrium is actually a Nash equilibrium of the game. Thus, let us denote our game by
G = (vi)
K
i=1. Then, we dene that G is a potential game if (vi)
K
i=1 allows for a continuously
dierentiable function W such that
@W (n)
@ni
  @W (n)
@nj
= vi(n)  vj(n) 8n 2 ;8i; j 2 S (10)
whereW is dened on an open set that contains  so that its partial derivative is well-dened
on . If the condition above holds, then W is referred to as a potential function.
For the moment, let us suppose that G is a potential game with the potential function
W . As mentioned in the introduction, the equilibria of a potential game are characterized
with the optimization problem of an associated potential function. Indeed, let us consider
the following problem:
max
n2
W (n): (11)
Let  be a Lagrange multiplier for the constraint
PK
i=1 ni = 1. Then, the rst-order condition
is @W (n)
@ni
  in which the equality holds whenever ni > 0. Then, by (10), we have vi(n) =
vj(n) for any populated cells i and j, and vk(n)  vi(n) if nk = 0 and ni > 0. Thus, n is a
spatial equilibrium. By similar reasoning, it follows that the converse is also true.13 That is,
if n is a spatial equilibrium, then it satises the necessary condition for problem (11). As a
result, the equilibrium set of G exactly coincides with the set of KKT points of problem (11).
The necessary and sucient condition for the existence of a potential function is given
by, for example, Hofbauer and Sigmund (1988), who referred to the condition as triangular
integrability. In our model, the agglomeration force T (n) is linear and the dispersion force
12A game with a continuum of anonymous players is called a population game (Sandholm, 2001). In our
game, players are anonymous in that the payo depends on only strategy distributions.
13See Proposition 3.1 of Sandholm (2001).
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h(n) is separable. As a result, the condition is stated as
dij + djk + dki = dik + dkj + dji for any i; j; k 2 S: (12)
Recall that our travel costs are pairwise symmetric (i.e., dij = dji for any i; j 2 S). Hence,
the above condition necessarily holds, and our game is, in fact, a potential game. Indeed,
the following lemma explicitly constructs a potential function for (vi)
K
i=1.
Lemma 1 G is a potential game with the potential function
W (n)  W1(n) +W2(n) (13)
where
W1(n) =  
I
T (n0)dn0 =  1
2
KX
i=1
KX
j=1
dijninj; (14)
W2(n) =
I
h(n0)dn0 =
KX
i=1
nif

i
ni

: (15)
Here,
H
denotes the line integral over a path in  connecting 0 to n. Since dij = dji for any
i; j 2 S, it is guaranteed that the line integrals are path-independent.
Let us observe that in our potential game, we can capture the tradeo between centrifugal
and centripetal forces as the tradeo between the concavity and convexity of the potential
function. Indeed, W2 is strictly concave since fi's are strictly concave, whereas W1 is quasi-
convex sinceD is non-negative and negative denite on the tangent space of .14 Moreover,
if the concavity of W2 dominates so that W is strictly concave, then a dispersed population
distribution (i.e., an interior point in ) is attained as a unique equilibrium. Conversely,
if the convexity of W1 dominates, then the equilibrium population distributions would be
more agglomerated. Therefore, W1 represents the centripetal force, whereas W2 represents
the centrifugal force.15
14See, for example, Theorem 4.4.6 of Bapat and Raghavan (1997).
15Blanchet et al. (2016) generalize the analysis of Mossay and Picard (2011) by taking the potential func-
tion(al) approach to characterize the equilibria of a continuous-space spatial interaction model. Takayama
and Akamatsu (2010), Akamatsu et al. (2014), and this study examine the properties of discrete-space models
by using the potential function, which is a discrete analogue of their potential functional.
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3 Stability of equilibrium
3.1 Adjustment dynamics
We are interested in the stability of equilibria, especially since our model generally includes
multiple equilibria, as shown in the next section. More specically, we examine whether we
can justify an equilibrium through the existence of a learning process that makes players
settle down in their equilibrium strategies. In this study, we describe players' learning
processes with evolutionary dynamics, or a (set-valued) dynamical system V that maps
population distribution n0 2  to a set of Lipschitz paths in , which starts from n0.16
Although we usually consider a specic evolutionary dynamics for stability analysis, we will
see that a more general analysis is possible owing to the existence of a potential function;
that is, the stability of equilibria can be characterized under a broad class of dynamics. In
particular, we consider the class of admissible dynamics, which is dened as follows:
Denition 2 An evolutionary dynamics V is admissible for G = (vi)
K
i=1, if, for almost all
t  0 and for all n0 2 , it satises the following conditions:
(PC) _n(t) 6= 0) _n(t)  v(n(t)) > 0 for all n(  ) 2 V (n0),
(NS) _n(t) = 0) n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G for all n(  ) 2 V (n0).
In order to interpret condition (PC), which is called positive correlation, we rewrite it as
_n(t)  v(n(t)) =
KX
i=1
_ni(t)
 
vi(n(t))  1
K
KX
j=1
vj(n(t))
!
: (16)
In general, it would be reasonable to expect that each term in the summation over i
is positive: if the payo from city i is higher than the average payo (i.e., vi(n(t))  
1
K
PK
j=1 vj(n(t)) > 0), t hen the mass of consumers choosing city i should increase (i.e.,
_ni(t) > 0), and vice versa. Condition (PC) only requires that this be true in the aggre-
gate. Thus, in learning periods, it is possible that the mass of consumers choosing city i
increases even though it yields a less-than-average payo. Condition (NS), which is called
Nash stationary, states that if there is a protable deviation, some consumers change their
cells. Under condition (PC), the converse is also true.17 Therefore, under conditions (PC)
and (NS), _n(t) = 0 if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium of G.
Specic examples of admissible dynamics include best response dynamics (Gilboa and
Matsui, 1991), Brown-von Neumann-Nash (BNN) dynamics (Brown and von Neumann,
16Considering a general dynamical system allows us to include set-valued dynamics such as the best-
response dynamics which is important from the game-theoretic point of view.
17See Proposition 4.3 of Sandholm (2001).
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1950), and projection dynamics (Dupuis and Nagurney, 1993).18 One important remark
is that replicator dynamics (Taylor and Jonker, 1978), which is often used in spatial eco-
nomic models (e.g., Fujita et al., 1999), is not admissible. Under replicator dynamics, a rest
point is always attained on the boundary, but the boundary points are not always Nash
equilibria. Therefore, condition (NS) does not hold under replicator dynamics.19
3.2 Stability condition of equilibrium
Admissible dynamics are closely related to the potential function and thereby to the stability
of Nash equilibria. Given such dynamics, we say that a population distribution n 2  is
stable if there exists a neighborhood U   of n such that n(t)! n for any trajectory n(  )
of the dynamics with n(0) 2 U . In particular, if we can consider  for U , then n is globally
stable. n 2  is unstable if it is not stable.
To understand how admissible dynamics are related to potential function, let us consider
our game G = (vi)
K
i=1, with the potential functionW given by (15). Note that, by conditions
(PC) and (NS), any trajectory n() of an admissible dynamic monotonically ascends the
potential function until it reaches a Nash equilibrium since
_W (n(t)) =
KX
i=1
@W (n(t))
@ni
_ni(t) =
KX
i=1
vi(n(t)) _ni(t) > 0 (17)
whenever _n(t) 6= 0.20 Hence, if Nash equilibrium n does not locally maximize W , then we
can perturb n so that the trajectory ascends W and moves away from the equilibrium. In
other words, assuming that each Nash equilibrium is isolated, a Nash equilibrium is stable
under any admissible dynamics if and only if it locally maximizes an associated potential
function.21 Therefore, if a game has a potential function, we can characterize the stability
of equilibria under admissible dynamics by examining the shape of the potential function.
3.3 Instability of population distributions
In light of the stability condition stated above, we start with investigating the relation
between the interaction cost  and the instability of spatial equilibria. Given a population
18See Sandholm (2005) for more examples.
19Any non-Nash rest point is never stable, where the stability is dened below, under the replicator
dynamics, though (Sandholm, 2010, Proposition 8.1.1). The replicator dynamics belongs to the class of
strict myopic adjustment dynamics due to Swinkels (1993) where Nash stationary is not imposed.
20Recall that _n(t) = 0 if and only if n(t) is a Nash equilibrium.
21See Sandholm (2001) for a formal argument about this.
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distribution, we obtain a sucient condition under which the population distribution could
not be stable even if it were a spatial equilibrium.
Given a population distribution n 2 , let supp (n) be the support of n (i.e., supp (n) =
fi 2 S : ni > 0g). Let us denote the cardinality of a vector x by jxj. Since a stable spatial
equilibrium locally maximizes potential functionW , we may investigate its Hessian while we
have to respect the constraint n 2 . To this end, let us consider the projection of  onto
RK 1, which is given by  = f 2 RK 1+ :
PK 1
i=1 i  1g, and represent the constraint
 2  with the following inequalities:
qi() =  i  0 for i = 1; 2; :::; K   1; (18)
qK() =
K 1X
i=1
i   1  0; (19)
for  2 RK 1. Then, the maximization problem of the potential function is written as
max
2RK 1
W ( q()) s.t. qi()  0 for all i 2 S; (20)
where q = (qi)
K
i=1. Let i()  0 be the Lagrange multiplier for the constraint qi()  0. We
assume that the problem (20) satises the strict complementary condition; that is, qi() =
0 ) i() > 0 for all i 2 S. In our context, this means that the spatial equilibrium is
quasi-strict (i.e., the payo of each unpopulated cell is strictly smaller than the (common)
payo of populated cells).
Assumption 3 Every spatial equilibrium is quasi-strict.
Let
Q() = [rqi() : i =2 supp ( q())] ; (21)
where rqi() is the gradient of qi() which is a (K   1)-dimensional vector. Q() is the
matrix comprising the gradients of constraints that are active at . Let us denote the matrix
of the orthogonal basis of the null space of Q() by Z().
Since qi() is linear in  for all i 2 S, [rqi() : i 2 S] =
0@  1 0  00  1  0...
0 0   1
1 1  1
1A is independent
of  2 . Hence, we denote it by Q. Let r2W (n) be the Hessian of W (n) at n 2 .
Then, it follows that, if  2  locally maximizes W ,
H()  Z()0Q0r2W ( q())QZ(); (22)
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is negative semi-denite.22 This is the Hessian that needs to be examined.23 In other words,
 q() 2  does not locally maximizeW and, thus, is not a stable equilibrium if H() is not
negative semi-denite, which also indicates that the largest eigenvalue of H() is positive.
Example 1 Let K = 4 and consider a population distribution  2  = f 0 2 R3+ :P3
i=1 
0
i  1g such that 1 = 0; 2 > 0; 3 > 0, and 2 + 3 < 1. Then, Q() = (  1 0 0 ). The
null space of Q() is two dimensional, and we can take Z() = ( 0 1 00 0 1 )
0 as its orthogonal
basis. Let n =  q(). Then, since QZ() =
  1 0 0
0  1 0
0 0  1
1 1 1

0 0
1 0
0 1

=

0 0 1 0
0  1
1 1

,
H() =
 
0  1 0 1
0 0  1 1
!
Jv(n)
 
0  1 0 1
0 0  1 1
!0
(23)
=
 
@(v2(n) v4(n))
@n2
  @(v2(n) v4(n))
@n4
@(v2(n) v4(n))
@n3
  @(v2(n) v4(n))
@n4
@(v3(n) v4(n))
@n2
  @(v3(n) v4(n))
@n4
@(v3(n) v4(n))
@n3
  @(v3(n) v4(n))
@n4
!
(24)
= 
( 
d42 d43
d42 d43
!
+
 
d24 d24
d34 d34
!
 
 
d22 d23
d32 d33
!)
+
 
 12 h
0(n2=2) +  14 h
0(n4=4)  14 h
0(n4=4)
 14 h
0(n4=4)  13 h
0(n3=3) +  14 h
0(n4=4)
!
;
(25)
where Jv(n) is the Jacobian of v at n. 
As shown in the example above, there is room for discretion regarding how to take Z()
even though it does not aect the stability. If supp ( q()) = fig for some i 2 S, then it
follows that H() / @vi( q())
@ni
whatever Z() we take. Hence,  q() cannot be a stable
equilibrium if @vi( q())
@ni
> 0. If more than one cell is populated, then room for discretion
arises since only the payo dierence matters for the equilibrium. Hence, we may take any
cell in the support as a \reference cell" from which the payo dierence is computed. In
the following, we take the cell having the highest index in the support as the reference cell.
More specically, given  2 , let n =  q() and supp (n) = fi1; i2; :::; iLg. Then, let us
take Z() so that
H()k` =
@(vik(n)  viL(n))
@ni`
  @(vik(n)  viL(n))
@niL
: (26)
In matrix form, we have
H() =  ~Dsupp (n) + ~H(n); (27)
22See the Appendix.
23H() is called the reduced Hessian. See, for example, Griva et al. (2009).
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where
~Dsupp (n) = 1
 (diiL)i2supp (n)nfiLg + (diiL)0i2supp (n)nfiLg 
 10  Dsupp (n) (28)
=
0BBBB@
di1iL di1iL    di1iL
di2iL di2iL    di2iL
...
...
. . .
...
diL 1iL diL 1iL    diL 1iL
1CCCCA+
0BBBB@
di1iL di1iL    di1iL
di2iL di2iL    di2iL
...
...
. . .
...
diL 1iL diL 1iL    diL 1iL
1CCCCA
0
 
0BBBB@
di1i1 di1i2    di1iL 1
di2i1 di2i2    di2iL 1
...
...
. . .
...
diL 1i1 diL 1i2    diL 1iL 1
1CCCCA ; (29)
~H(n) =
1
iL
h0(
niL
iL
)110 + diag

1
i1
h0(ni1
i1
);
1
i2
h0(ni2
i2
);    ; 1
iL 1
h0(
niL 1
iL 1
)

: (30)
In (28), Dsupp (n) is the submatrix of D that corresponds to the indices in supp (n) and 

denotes the Kronecker product, whereas, in (30), diag(x) is the diagonal matrix having x as
its diagonal elements.
To attain a threshold value of  above which the largest eigenvalue of H() is positive,
we invoke Weyl's inequality, which states that
max(H())  L 1(H())  L j( ~Dsupp (n)) + j( ~H(n)) (31)
for 2  j  L   1, where i(M) is the i-th smallest eigenvalue of matrix M .24 Although
we made some adjustments to account for feasibility constraints, we can see that ~Dsupp (n)
corresponds to the agglomeration force W1(n), whereas ~H(n) corresponds to the dispersion
force W2(n). Indeed, as shown in the proof of Proposition 1 below, ~Dsupp (n) is positive
denite and all its eigenvalues are positive. Thus, ~Dsupp (n) acts as the destabilizing force
against interior distributions. Conversely, since h is decreasing, all of ~H(n)'s eigenvalues,
except for one zero eigenvalue, are negative. Hence, ~H(n) acts as the stabilizing force.
Furthermore, the threshold value is attained when these two forces are balanced:
Proposition 1 Under Assumptions 1-3, a population distribution n 2  such that supp (n) =
24Weyl's inequality states that p(B+C)  p+q(B)+n q(C) for q 2 f0; 1; 2; :::; n pg and p(B+C) 
p q+1(B) + q(C) for q 2 f1; 2; :::; pg where B and C are n  n symmetric matrices. See Theorem 4.3.1
and Corollary 4.3.3 of Horn and Johnson (2013).
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fi1; i2; :::; iLg where L  2 cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 > min
2jL 1
j 1(diag[( 1i jh0(ni=i)j)i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g])
L j( ~Dsupp (n))
:
Proof. See the Appendix.
As an illustrating example, let us consider a discrete-analogue of Mossay and Picard's
(2011) model in which dij = jxi   xjj; f(x) =   2x , and i = 1=K. Observe that the uniform
discretization, where the same amount of land is allocated to each cell, necessarily implies
i = 1=K for all i 2 S since the total area of the region is normalized to one.
Assumption 4 (Uniform discretization) i = 1=K for all i 2 S.
Let supp (n) = fi1; i2; :::; iLg. The specications above imply j(diag[( 1i jh0(ni=i)j)i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g]) =
K for any j 2 f1; 2; :::; L 1g. We aim to derive explicit expressions for the threshold values
of  .
To this end, we exploit the fact that if the interaction cost is linear, then the support
of a spatial equilibrium can be considered to be a downsized replica of the entire region.
More specically, any populated cells in a spatial equilibrium are congregated (i.e., there is
no vacant cell between any populated cells), as shown in the following lemma25:
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 2 and dij = jxi xjj. Then, the support of spatial equilibrium
is given by fi1; i2:::; iLg  S, where ik+1 = ik + 1 for any k = 1; :::; L  1.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Let n 2  be a spatial equilibrium such that supp (n) = fi1; i2; :::; iLg, where L  2. By
Lemma 2, ~Dsupp (n) is written as
~Dsupp (n) =
2
K
0BBBBBBB@
L  1 L  2 L  3    1
L  2 L  2 L  3    1
L  3 L  3 L  3    1
...
...
...
. . .
...
1 1 1    1
1CCCCCCCA
: (32)
Note that if two equilbria have the same number of populated cells, then the Hessian is
the same in the model. This will be a key observation when addressing the multiplicity of
equilibria in the following section. When deriving eigenvalues of ~Dsupp (n), it turns out to be
25Mossay and Picard (2011) invoke an analogue observation for their continuous space model.
14
more convenient to examine its inverse, which is given by
~D 1supp (n) =
K
2
0BBBBBBBBB@
1  1
 1 2  1
 1 2  1
. . . . . . . . .
 1 2  1
 1 2
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (33)
This is an (L 1)(L 1)-dimensional tridiagonal Toeplitz matrix in which the upper-left cor-
ner is perturbed and for which explicit expressions of eigenvalues are known. In particular, we
have j( ~D
 1
supp (n)) = K

1  cos (2j 1)
2L 1

, and hence j( ~Dsupp (n)) =
1
K

1  cos (2(L j) 1)
2L 1
 1
.
Note that these eigenvalues depend on the number of populated cells but not on the distri-
bution over the support of equilibrium. Hence, the following result is obtained:
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumptions 3-4, dij = jxi xjj, and f(x) =   2x . Then, a population
distribution n 2  having L ( 2) populated cells cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium if
 >  l(L) 

1  cos 3
2L  1

K2: (34)
There are two remarks here. First, since  l(2) >  l(3) >  l(4) >    , the maximum
possible number of populated cells that might constitute a stable spatial equilibrium is non-
increasing in  . Second, since K 7!  l(K) is continuous on R+ and limK!1  l(K) =
9
8
2 <1, it is bounded. Thus, if  is suciently large, then a population distribution with
full support cannot be a stable spatial equilibrium for any nite K.
4 Characterization of equilibria
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the discrete-space model to compare its prop-
erties with those of the continuous-space model. In the continuous-space model, it follows
that a unimodal population distribution is attained as the unique spatial equilibrium up to
translation (Mossay and Picard, 2011).26 Section 4.1 shows that, as in the continuous-space
model, the equilibrium population density of the discrete-space model is unimodal. How-
ever, in Section 4.2, we see that the equilibrium is essentially non-unique in the sense that
equilibria with dierent population distributions over the support coexist.
26In the next section, we will show that the spatial equilibrium of a general class of continuous-space model
is unimodal (Lemma 5)
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4.1 Equilibrium population distribution
Suppose that the interaction cost is linear (i.e., dij = jxi xjj). Then, by Lemma 2, populated
cells in a spatial equilibrium are congregated, i.e., supp (n) = fi ; i  + 1; :::; i+   1; i+g for
some i ; i+ 2 S. Then, since vi(n) = vi 1(n) for all i 2 supp (n)nfi g, the equilibrium
condition is written as
h

ni
i

  h

ni 1
i 1

= i
8<:2
i 1X
k=i 
nk   1
9=; 8i 2 supp (n)nfi g; (35)
where i = xi   xi 1 > 0. Since
P
k2supp (n) nk = 1, (35) implies that there exist i
 2 S
such that h(ni=i) is decreasing [resp. increasing] in i for i  i [resp. i  i], as long asPi 1
k=i  nk 6= 12 for any i 2 supp (n)nfi g. If
Pi 1
k=i  nk =
1
2
for some i 2 supp (n)nfi g, then
there are two cells at which h attains its bottom. In any case, f h(ni=i)gi2S is unimodal.
Since h is strictly decreasing, this is also true for (ni=i)i2S.
Proposition 2 Suppose Assumption 2 and dij = jxi xjj. Then, the equilibrium population
density distribution (ni=i)i2S of the discrete-space model is unimodal.
This proposition shows that the equilibrium population density distribution (ni=i)i2S of
the discrete-space model exhibits a property similar to that of the continuous-space model.
Furthermore, the equilibrium population distribution n is also unimodal, especially if we
consider the uniform discretization of space (i.e., i =
1
K
for all i 2 S).
4.2 Multiplicity of spatial equilibria
4.2.1 Non-uniform discretizations
In this subsection, we examine the uniqueness of equilibrium in discrete space. We rst
consider the case of the non-uniform discretization of space (i.e., there exists i; j 2 S such
that i 6= j).27 We show through examples that dierent population distributions can be
KKT points of problem (11) (and thus spatial equilibria) in this case. We consider two
models: Beckmann's (1976) model in which f(x) =  lnx and Mossay and Picard's (2011)
model in which f(x) =   
2x
. In either model, we consider the linear interaction cost in
which dij = jxi   xjj. We assume that K = 3, (b1; b2) = (0:2; 0:5), and  = 1:0. Under
these parameters, Figures 1 and 2 depict the contour plots of each model's potential function,
27Note that when we perform an empirical analysis, we often need to discretize a space non-uniformly
since social and economic data is aggregated over some geographical areas and, in general, these areas are
not uniformly sized.
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 = 8:0
Figure 1: Contour plot of the potential function of Mossay and Picard's (2011) model (:
stable, : unstable)
  0.8   0.6   0.4   0.2     0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
  0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
  0
1
1
1
(a)  = 1:0
  0.8   0.6   0.4   0.2     0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
  0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
  0
1
1
1
(b)  = 8:0
Figure 2: Contour plot of the potential function of Beckmann's (1976) model (: stable, :
unstable)
respectively. In these gures, the background color represents the value of potential function:
the regions in which the value is the largest are red, while the regions in which the value is
the smallest are blue. To characterize equilibria with these gures, we invoke the fact that
local maximizers of potential function are stable equilibria, whereas any other KKT points
are unstable equilibria.
According to Figure 1, we can see that when  = 1:0, the potential function is strictly
concave, and thus, there exists a unique equilibrium that is stable. However, when  = 8:0,
the potential function fails to concave, and three equilibria arise: 1) full agglomeration in
cell 3, the largest cell; 2) the population is agglomerated in cells 1 and 2, the two smaller
cells; and 3) full support in which all cells are populated. As shown in Figure 2, Beckmann's
(1976) model has qualitatively similar properties to those of Mossay and Picard's (2011)
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Figure 3: Contour plot of the potential function of uniformly discretized Mossay and Picard's
(2011) model (: stable equilibrium, : unstable equilibrium)
model. These results show that if we consider a non-uniform discretization, then equilibria
with dierent population distributions can coexist.
4.2.2 Uniform discretizations
Based on the results above, one might think that they stem from the exogenous asymmetry
in space. Hence, we next consider uniform discretizations. In this case, the label of the
cell should not matter when discussing the multiplicity of equilibria. That is, we do not
distinguish between two equilibria such that one equilibrium is obtained by horizontally
shifting the other one, which can arise in this case. For example, let us look at two unstable
equilibria in Figure 3, which depicts a contour plot of the potential function of Mossay and
Picard's (2011) model with K = 3, [b1; b2] = [
1
3
; 2
3
],  = 1:0, and  = 15:0. One equilibrium is
(1
2
; 1
2
; 0) whereas the other equilibrium is (0; 1
2
; 1
2
). However the two population distributions
can be merged through translation.
In what follows, we assume that the equilibrium, if any, is unique for each possible
support.
Assumption 5 The number of equilibria is, at most, one for each possible support.
This is true for Mossay and Picard's (2011) model in which the equilibrium solves the system
of linear equations. In this case, since the interaction cost is symmetric, we can regard any
two equilibria as qualitatively identical in the above sense whenever they have the same num-
ber of populated cells. In other words, two equilibria are indistinguishable up to translation
unless they have dierent numbers of populated cells. Therefore, under Assumption 5, we
say that the spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique if equilibria with dierent numbers
of populated cells simultaneously exist, and we focus on this essential multiplicity.
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We show that the equilibrium can be essentially non-unique, even if the space is uniformly
discretized. To this end, we refer to the index theorem of Simsek et al. (2007), which is
applicable to the set of KKT points (See Proposition 5.2 of the paper). This is relevant
for us since our equilibrium problem is reduced to nding KKT points of the optimization
problem of the potential function. In our context, their result is stated as follows.
Recall that the problem (20) is the optimization problem that characterizes spatial equi-
libria. Denote the map  7! W ( q()) by W  ( q). Given the problem (20), let
 () = Z()0
0@HW( q)() + X
i=2supp ( q())
i()Hqi()
1AZ(); (36)
where HW( q)() [resp. Hqi()] is the Hessian of W  ( q) [resp. qi] at . Let KKT(W; q)
be the set of KKT points of the problem (20). Then, for each  2 KKT(W; q), we dene the
index by
ind () =
8>>><>>>:
1 if det( ()) > 0;
0 if det( ()) = 0;
 1 if det( ()) < 0;
(37)
where det( ()) is the determinant of  (). Then, under the assumptions mentioned later,
the index theorem states that X
2KKT(W;q)
ind () = 1: (38)
Note that all of the constraints (qi)
K
i=1 are linear. Hence, Hqi is the zero matrix for any i 2 S.
Then, since HW( q)() = Q0r2W ( q())Q, it turns out that  () = H(). Observe that
this is exactly the Hessian that we have used for the stability analysis. This illustrates how
useful the potential function is, not only for the stability analysis, but also for analysis of
the multiplicity of equilibria.
The index theorem holds under the following three assumptions. The rst one is that
W  ( q) is twice continuously dierentiable, which holds under Assumption 2. The second
one is that the problem (20) satises the strict complementary condition, which holds under
Assumption 3. The nal one is that  () is non-singular at any  2 KKT(W; q). Since
 () = H() and the KKT points of the problem (20) correspond to spatial equilibria, the
following assumption is necessary:
Assumption 6 For any  2  such that  q() 2  is a spatial equilibrium, H() is
nonsingular.
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In order to apply the index theorem to the issue of the multiplicity of equilibria, we assume
the linear interaction cost in order to invoke Lemma 2. Lemma 2, together with Assumption
5, enables us to determine the number of equilibria for each number of populated cells. More
specically, if an equilibrium with L populated cells exists, then there are K   L + 1 such
equilibria. Moreover, since these equilibria have the same distribution over the support (i.e.,
these equilibria are essentially indistinguishable), all their indices have the same value. These
observations lead us to the following result:
Lemma 3 Suppose Assumptions 2-6 and dij = jxi   xjj. If there is a spatial equilibrium n
such that jsupp (n)j < K, then there is another spatial equilibrium n0 such that jsupp (n0)j 6=
jsupp (n)j.
Proof. Suppose, to the contrary, that for some L < K, jsupp (n)j = L for any equilibrium
n. By Lemma 2, the number of equilibria is thenK L+1. Since the population distribution
over the support is identical for all equilibria, the index given by (37) is the same for all
equilibria. Hence, the total sum of the indices is either K  L+ 1; (K  L+ 1), or 0. Any
of them contradicts the index theorem.
Thus, if a spatial equilibrium having some unpopulated cells exists, then there is necessar-
ily another spatial equilibrium that is essentially dierent from the equilibrium. Therefore,
if the spatial equilibrium exists uniquely, then all the cells in the region must be populated
in the unique equilibrium.
Recall that, given a full-support distribution, we have obtained a sucient condition
under which it is not an equilibrium or it is an unstable equilibrium (Proposition 1). Observe
that, since the potential function is continuous and  is compact, a stable equilibrium, which
is a maximizer of the potential function, exists. Hence, if a full-support distribution is not
an equilibrium, then Lemma 3 immediately implies the essential multiplicity of equilibria.
Furthermore, if a full-support distribution is an equilibrium but unstable, a maximizer of
the potential function, which is a stable equilibrium, does not have the full support. Thus,
even if a full-support distribution is an equilibrium, Lemma 3 applies as long as it is not
stable. Therefore, by Proposition 1, we conclude the following result.
Proposition 3 Suppose Assumptions 2-6 and dij = jxi   xjj. If
 > sup
fn2:supp (n)=Sg
min
2jK 1
j 1(diag[( 1i jh0(ni=i)j)i2S])
K j( ~DS)
;
then the equilibrium is essentially non-unique.
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For a corollary of the above result, let us consider Mossay and Picard's (2011) model in which
f(x) =   
2x
. Then, the threshold value of  is independent of the population distribution,
and the equilibrium is essentially non-unique when  >  l(K), where  l is given by (34).
Moreover, since maxK2N  l(K) exists, the spatial equilibrium is essentially non-unique for
any nite K if  is larger than the maximal value.
Overall, the (essential) multiplicity of equilibria in a discrete space suggests that im-
plications derived from (theoretical/empirical) analyses focusing on a particular equilibrium
might be questionable since its equilibrium might be unstable and another stable equilibrium
with an essentially dierent population distribution can exist.
5 The limit of discrete-space models
5.1 Continuous-space models
This section examines the continuous limit of discrete-space model. However, we begin by
presenting the structure of a continuous-space model and consider the real line for the region,
even though we subsequently focus on the unit interval, as in the discrete-space model. Let
 2 f 2 L1(R) :   0; R (x)dx = 1g be an (integrable) population density over R. In the
continuous-space model, the indirect utility at location xi is given by
v(xi)  Y   
Z
jx  xij(x)dx+ h((xi)); (39)
where we focus on the linear interaction cost. Let supp ()  R be the support of population
density . For a continuous-space model, the spatial equilibrium is dened in relation to
the population density. That is,  is a spatial equilibrium if there exists u 2 R such that
v(x) = u
 for any x 2 supp () whereas v(x)  u for any x =2 supp (). In addition,
we make the following assumption on the support of the spatial equilibrium.
Assumption 7 supp () is nite for every spatial equilibrium .
For example, this is the case for Mossay and Picard's (2011) model.
In a discrete-space model, we have seen that the population distribution is congregated
at any spatial equilibrium when the interaction cost is linear (Lemma 2). Naturally, this
also holds for the continuous-space model:
Lemma 4 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 7, and the linear interaction cost. Then, the support
of the spatial equilibrium of the continuous-space model is a nite open interval.
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Proof. See the Appendix.
In Section 4.1, we represented the equilibrium condition as a dierence equation in order
to characterize equilibria of the discrete-space model. Likewise, we represent the equilibrium
condition as a dierential equation to characterize equilibria of the continuous-space model.
To this end, let H(x) = h((x)) be the net utility from the land consumption at location
x. As it turns out, looking at H, instead of directly looking at , is more convenient for
characterizing equilibria. In fact, at the equilibrium, H(x) satises the following condition:28
Lemma 5 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 7, and the linear interaction cost. Then, H(x) is
the equilibrium net utility from the land consumption of the continuous-space model if and
only if it solves the following equations:
dH(x)
dx
= 

2
Z x
x 
g(H(z))dz   1

8x 2 [x ; x+]; (40a)Z x+
x 
g(H(x))dx = 1; g(H(x))  0 8x 2 [x ; x+]; (40b)
H(x ) = H(x+) = h(0); (40c)
for some x ; x+ 2 R with x   x+, where g is the inverse function of h.
Proof. See the Appendix.
(40a) and (40b) imply that there exists x0 2 [x ; x+] such that dH(x)dx < 0 for x 2 [x ; x0)
and dH(x)
dx
> 0 for x 2 (x0; x+]. That is, H(x) is U-shaped. This shows that as in the discrete-
space model (Proposition 2), the spatial equilibrium (x) = h 1(H(x)) of the continuous-
space model is unimodal.
5.2 Continuous limit of discrete-space models
The continuous-space model has been rigorously studied by Blanchet et al. (2016), and
we can invoke some of their results if we additionally assume that limx!0 h(x) = 0.29 In
particular, since the utility of land consumption f is strictly concave and increasing, and
the interaction cost is symmetric and linear, the spatial equilibrium of the continuous-space
model is essentially unique by Theorem 3 in Blanchet et al. (2016). This is in sharp contrast
to the results of the discrete-space model obtained thus far. Nevertheless, we show in this
28Lemma 5 implies that for a given x  (or x+), the equilibrium net utility from the land consumption and
x+ (or x ) of the continuous-space model is obtained by solving (40).
29In this case, Beckmann's (1976) model is excluded.
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subsection that the continuous-space model can be viewed as the continuous limit of the
discrete-space model.
For discrete-space models, we consider a nite region, whereas the region of continuous-
space models is innite. One might worry that the boundaries of this region will aect the
analysis. However, the following lemma shows that, as long as we consider a region that is
larger than the length of the continuous-space model's equilibrium support, a full-support
distribution cannot be an equilibrium of the discrete-space model when K is large. Observe
that, since the spatial equilibrium is unique up to translation in the continuous-space model,
the length of the continuous-space model's equilibrium support is uniquely determined.
Lemma 6 Suppose Assumption 2 and dij = jxi   xjj. Consider a discrete-space model
for which the region is given by [0; L] where L is larger than the length of the equilibrium
support of the continuous-space model over R. Then, a full-support distribution cannot be
an equilibrium for suciently large Ks.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Hence, as long as the region can contain the equilibrium of the continuous-space model, we
do not have to worry about the exogenous boundaries. Therefore, without loss of generality,
we assume that the length of the continuous-space model's equilibrium support is less than
one so that we can keep the original setting in which the region is given by the unit interval.
Now let us consider a sequence fnKg of equilibria of discrete-space models, where nK
is an equilibrium of the discrete-space model with K cells. Given fnKg, let HKi = h(Ki ),
where Ki = n
K
i =i, denote the equilibrium net utility from the land consumption at cell i
in the discrete-space model with K cells. By Lemma 2, the support of nK is represented by
fiK  ; iK  + 1; :::; iK+   1; iK+g for some iK  and iK+ where 1  iK   iK+  K. Then, it follows
from (35) that, for each K, HK = fHKi gi2supp (nK) solves the following equations:
HKi  HKi 1
i
= 
8<:2
i 1X
j=iK 
g(HKj )j   1
9=; 8i 2 fiK  ; iK  + 1; :::; iK+   1; iK+g; (41a)
iK+X
j=iK 
g(HKj )k = 1; g(HKi )  0 8i 2 fiK  ; iK  + 1; :::; iK+   1; iK+g; (41b)
which converge to (40a) and (40b) respectively as K ! 1. Let x  = limK!1 xiK  and
x+ = limK!1 xiK+ . Since xiK  ; xiK+ 2 (0; 1) for all K, x   0 and x+  1. Furthermore, since
the length of the continuous-space model's equilibrium support is unique and less than one,
we have either x  > 0; x+ < 1, or both by Lemma 6. Without loss of generality, suppose
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x+ < 1. Then, for suciently large K, xiK++1  1 for which viK+  viK++1 and KiK++1 = 0.
Hence,
h(0)  h((xiK+ )) = HKiK++1  H
K
iK+
 iK++1 ) h(0)  h((x+))  0: (42)
Since h is decreasing, (x+) = 0. The symmetry of the equilibrium then implies (x ) = 0.
Thus, the equilibrium condition of the discrete-space model eventually coincides with that
of the continuous-space model, as K !1.
Unfortunately, the nite dierence method, which studies the relationships between dif-
ference and dierential equations, shows that the convergence of the equilibrium condition
does not imply that of the equilibrium.30 Therefore, in the following, we show the conver-
gence of the equilibrium.
Let nK be an equilibrium of the discrete-space model with K cells. Our aim is to show
that, for any sequence of equilibria fnKg, there exists an equilibrium  of the continuous-
space model such that
lim
K!1

max
i2supp (nK)
j(xi)  Ki j

= 0; (43)
where Ki = n
K
i =
K
i . However, as the preceding arguments have demonstrated, considering
the net utility from the land consumption is more convenient than directly considering the
population density. More specically, let H(x) = h((x)) and HK = fh(Ki )gi2supp (nK). The
following proposition shows that
lim
K!1

max
i2supp (nK)
H(xi) HKi  = 0: (44)
Under Assumption 2, g, the inverse of h, is Lipschitz continuous. As a result, for some
C > 0,
j(xi)  Ki j = jg(H(xi))  g(HKi )j  CjH(xi) HKi j: (45)
Therefore, (44) implies (43).
In order to obtain the result, we impose a restriction on how space is discretized, by
assuming that limK!1maxi2S KKi < 1. Obviously, this includes the case of the uniform
discretization since Ki = 1=K for all i 2 S implies maxi2S KKi = 1 for all K.
Proposition 4 Suppose Assumptions 2 and 7, and the linear interaction cost. Moreover,
suppose limK!1maxi2S KKi < 1. Let fnKg be a sequence of the discrete-space model's
30See LeVeque (2007).
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equilibria with support fiK  ; iK +1;    ; iK+ 1; iK+g for eachK. Then, there exists a continuous-
space model's equilibrium  with support (x ; x+)  [0; 1] where x  = limK!1 xiK  and
x+ = limK!1 xiK+ such that (44) holds.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Observe that the sequence of spatial equilibria is arbitrary. Thus, any sequence of spatial
equilibria converges on the unique equilibrium of the continuous-space model. In addition,
recall that the spatial equilibrium in a discrete space is generally not unique. Nevertheless,
every equilibrium converges on the single equilibrium as K ! 1. This means that the set
of spatial equilibria parametrized by K is upper hemi-continuous at the limit. Furthermore,
since the spatial equilibrium in the continuous space is unique, the lower hemi-continuity is
implied by the upper hemi-continuity. Therefore, the set of spatial equilibria is continuous
in K at the limit.31 This is a positive result for the continuous-space model. As long as K
is suciently large, the continuous-space model can be viewed as a good approximation of
the discrete-space model, which is relevant for real economies.
6 Conclusion
We studied the discrete-space agglomeration model with social interactions and its connec-
tion to the corresponding continuous-space model. We showed that any sequence of the
discrete-space model's equilibria converges on the unique equilibrium of the continuous-
space model, as the distance between adjacent cells vanishes. However, by appealing to the
properties of the potential game, we found that, contrary to the continuous-space model,
the spatial equilibrium can be essentially non-unique for any nite number of cells. Thus,
while all equilibria should be close to one another when the cell size is suciently small, the
problem of multiple equilibria is not negligible.
In this paper, we considered social interactions among a single type of agents. Hence,
the natural extension is to consider multiple types of agents. There is rich literature on
(continuous-space) social interaction models that include both consumers and rms.32 Owing
to general equilibrium eects, the properties of equilibrium are more complex than the class
of models considered here. In particular, equilibrium is generally not unique even in the
continuous-space model, although the stability of equilibria has not been explored. It is
31Recall that the equilibrium of the continuous-space model is only unique up to translation. Thus, strictly
speaking, what we are actually considering here is the set of population distributions over their supports
that are attained at equilibria, rather than the set of equilibria itself.
32See Chapter 6 of Fujita and Thisse (2013) and references therein.
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dicult to determine the stability of equilibria in the continuous-space model, but we may
be able to address this by approximating the model with a discrete-space model.33
Finally, although we did not engage in policy discussions, the spatial equilibrium of our
model is generally not ecient since social interactions cause externalities. Indeed, the
population distribution is more concentrated at the social optimum than at the market
equilibrium. This is a consequence of positive externalities in social interactions, which
yields under-agglomeration.34 Thus, in order to achieve the social optimum, it is necessary
that planners internalize these externalities. However, since the equilibrium under such an
intervention is not necessarily unique as in a laissez-faire case, there may exist a stable
equilibrium besides social optima. Therefore, in contrast to the continuous world, the policy
design to achieve a social optimum in the discrete world is not straightforward, owing to the
multiplicity of equilibria. This is an important subject for future research.35
Appendix
Derivation of the Hessian (22)
Suppose that the rst-order conditions of the problem (20) hold at  2 RK 1. Then, we
are interested in whether  (locally) maximizes the potential function. A feasible direction
p from  satises Q()p  0. Let ^() be the vector of Lagrange multipliers for active
constraints (i.e., ^() = fi()gi=2supp ( q())). If Q()p < 0, then we have
p0rW ( q())0 = p0Q()0^() < 0
under the strict complementarity. Thus, we may focus on direction p such that Q()p = 0.
Note that any feasible point is written as  0 =  + p. Because p belongs to the null space
of Q(), the set of feasible points is then f 0 :  0 =  + Z()x;x 2 RK 1g.
Hence, we may study the second-order condition of the problem (20) at  2  by
examining the following unconstrained problem:
max
x2RK 1
W ( q( + Z()x)): (46)
The condition that the Hessian (22) is negative-semidenite corresponds to the second-order
33Blanchet et al. (2016) pave the way for using a potential function(al) to characterize the equilibria of a
continuous-space model. However, they still abstract away from the stability analysis.
34Observe that the dispersion force due to the housing congestion is a pecuniary externality.
35Sandholm (2007) and Fujishima (2013) consider Pigouvian tax policies in the presence of multiple equi-
libria.
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necessary condition of the problem (46) at x = 0.
Proof of Lemma 2. Suppose, on the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium n 2 
in which, for some i; j 2 supp (n) with j   i  2, n` = 0 for all i < ` < j. Let k 2
fi+1; ::; j  1g. Since nk = 0 at equilibrium, h(0) <1. Without loss of generality, supposePi
`=1 n` 
PK
`=j n`. Then, because d`k+dkj = d`j for `  i whereas dkj+dj` = dk` for `  j,
vi(n)  vj(n)  vk(n)  vj(n)
= 
X
`
(dj`   dk`)n` + h(0)  h(nj=j)
> 
X
`
(dj`   dk`)n` * h is decreasing
= djk
 
iX
`=1
n`  
KX
`=j
n`
!
 0;
which contradicts the supposition i; j 2 supp (n).
Proof of Proposition 1. Given  2 , let n =  q() and supp (n) = fi1; i2; :::; iLg  S
where L  2 (and hence jsupp (n)j = L). At rst, we show that ~Dsupp (n) is positive denite.
Let x 2 RK be a vector such that xi = 0 for all i =2 fi1; i2; :::; iL 1g, and let ~x 2 RK be
a vector such that ~xi = xi for all i 6= iL and ~xiL =  
PiL 1
i=i1
xi. Note that ~x 2 T. Since
[ ~Dsupp (n)]ij = diiL + diLj   dij,
iL 1X
i;j=i1
(diiL + diLj   dij)xixj =  
iL 1X
i=i1
diiLxi~xiL  
iL 1X
j=i1
diLj~xiLxj  
iL 1X
i;j=i1
dijxixj
=  
iLX
i;j=i1
dij~xi~xj =  
KX
i;j=1
dij~xi~xj > 0;
where the last inequality follows from the assumption that D is negative denite on T.
Then, since (xi)i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g is arbitrary, ~Dsupp (n) is positive denite. Hence, all of ~Dsupp (n)'s
eigenvalues are positive. Second, we have
~H(n) = diag[( 1i h
0(ni=i))i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g] + 
 1
iL
h0(niL=iL)11
0; (47)
where diag(x) is a diagonal matrix having xi for its (i; i)-th element, and 1 is a row vec-
tor of ones with an appropriate dimension. The eigenvalues of  1iL h
0(niL=iL)11
0 are (L  
1) 1iL h
0(niL=iL) and 0. Accordingly, the matrix has exactly one negative eigenvalue, since h
is decreasing. Thus, byWeyl's inequality, j( ~H(n))  j 1(diag[( 1i h0(ni=i))i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g])+
2(
 1
iL
h0(niL=iL)11
0) = j 1(diag[( 1i h
0(ni=i))i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g]) for each j = 2; 3; :::; L.
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Then, by invoking Weyl's inequality for  ~Dsupp (n) + ~H(n), we obtain
max(H())  L 1(H())  L j( ~Dsupp (n)) + j( ~H(n)) (48)
 L j( ~Dsupp (n)) + j 1(diag[( 1i h0(ni=i))i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g])
(49)
where 2  j  L 1. Since ni > 0 for all i 2 fi1; i2; :::; iL 1g, j 1(diag[( 1i h0(ni=i))i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g]) 2
( 1; 0) for any j 2 f2; 3; :::; L  1g. Therefore, we obtain the stated result.
Proof of Corollaries 1. We invoke the results of Yueh and Cheng (2008), which are
restated as follows:36
Theorem 2 (Yueh and Cheng, 2008) Consider the n n real matrix of the form0BBBBBBBBB@
m2 +m4 m3
m1 m2 m3
m1 m2 m3
. . . . . . . . .
m1 m2 m3
m1 m2 +m5
1CCCCCCCCCA
: (50)
(i) Let 0 <  < . Then, the eigenvalues of the matrix above are given by
 = m2 + 2
p
m1m3 cos ; (51)
where  solves
m1m3 sin(n+ 1) +m4m5 sin(n  1)  pm1m3(m4 +m5) sinn = 0: (52)
(ii) If ~ =
p
m1=m3 [resp. ~ =  
p
m1=m3] solves
m1m3(n+ 1) +m4m5(n  1) m3~(m4 +m5)n = 0; (53)
then m2 + 2
p
m1m3 [resp. m2   2pm1m3] is an eigenvalue of the matrix above (these
correspond to the case in which  2 f0; g).
Our matrix (33) corresponds to the case in which m1 = m3 =  K2 ;m2 = K;m4 =
36They consider more general matrices than (50), where upper right and lower left corners can also be
nonzero. They also allow complex matrices.
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 K
2
;m5 = 0, and n = L  1. Then, (52) becomes
K4
4
(sinL   sin(L  1)) = K
4
4
sin

2
cos
(2L  1)
2
= 0: (54)
Because 0 <  < , sin 
2
6= 0 and hence cos (2L 1)
2
= 0)  = (2j 1)
2L 1 where j = 1; 2; :::; L 1.
Moreover, (53) is given by
K2
4
(L  ~(L  1)) = 0; (55)
and neither ~ = 1 nor ~ =  1 solves the equation above. Hence, the eigenvalues of matrix
(33) are given by K(1   cos (2j 1)
2L 1 ) where j = 1; 2; :::; L   1. In particular, since K(1  
cos (2j 1)
2L 1 ) is its j-th smallest eigenvalue, j(
~Dsupp (n)) =
1
K
(1  cos (2(L j) 1)
2L 1 )
 1. Thus,
min
2jL 1
j 1(diag[(jh0i(ni)j)i2fi1;i2;:::;iL 1g])
L j( ~Dsupp (n))
=
K
max2jL 1 L j( ~Dsupp (n))
(56)
= KL 2( ~Dsupp (n)) 1 (57)
=

1  cos 3
2L  1

K2: (58)
Proof of Lemma 4. By Corollary 1 of Blanchet et al. (2016), the spatial equilibrium is
continuous. Hence, the support of the equilibrium is open. We argue in an analogue manner
as the proof of Lemma 2. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists an equilibrium  for
which supp () = (x1 ; x
1
+) [ (x2 ; x2+) with x1+ < x2 .
Let x1 2 (x1 ; x1+); x2 2 (x2 ; x2+), and x^ 2 (x1+; x2 ), respectively. Without loss of general-
ity, suppose
R x1+
x1 
(z)dz  R x2+
x2 
(z)dz. Then, we have
v(x
1)  v(x2)  v(x^)  v(x2)
>  
Z
jx^  zj(z)dz + 
Z
jx2   zj(z)dz * h is decreasing
= (x2   x^)
 Z x1+
x1 
(z)dz  
Z x2+
x2 
(z)dz
!
 0;
which contradicts the supposition x1; x2 2 supp ().
Proof of Lemma 5. Suppose that  is an equilibrium. By Lemma 4, supp () = (x ; x+)
for some x ; x+ 2 R. Then, v(x) = v for all x 2 (x ; x+) where v is the equilibrium
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utility level. Moreover, since v(x) is continuous in x, v(x ) = v(x+) = v. Hence,
y   
Z x+
x 
jx  yj(y)dy + h((x)) = v 8x 2 [x ; x+]: (59)
Dierentiating this equation with respect to x yields
dh((x))
dx
= 
Z x
x 
(z)dz  
Z x+
x
(z)dz

8x 2 [x ; x+]: (60)
Substituting the population constraint
R x+
x 
(z)dz = 1 and (x) = g(H(x)) into this,37 we
have (40a). Meanwhile, (40b) is obtained from the population constraint, while (40c) is
obtained from (x ) = (x+) = 0.
Conversely, suppose that  solves the system (40a)-(40c) for some x ; x+ 2 R. Let
x1; x2 2 [x ; x+] with x2 > x1. Then, integrating (60) over [x1; x2],
h((x2))  h((x1)) = 
(Z x2
x1
Z x
x 
(z)dzdx 
Z x2
x1
Z x+
x
(z)dzdx
)
: (61)
By integration by parts,Z x2
x1
Z x
x 
(z)dzdx = x2
Z x2
x 
(z)dz   x1
Z x1
x 
(z)dz  
Z x2
x1
z(z)dz; (62)Z x2
x1
Z x+
x
(z)dzdx = x2
Z x+
x2
(z)dz   x1
Z x+
x1
(z)dz +
Z x2
x1
z(z)dz: (63)
However, observe thatZ x+
x 
jx2   zj(z)dz  
Z x+
x 
jx1   zj(z)dz
= x2
(Z x2
x 
(z)dz  
Z x+
x2
(z)dz
)
  x1
(Z x1
x 
(z)dz  
Z x+
x1
(z)dz
)
  2
Z x2
x1
z(z)dz:
(64)
Therefore, v(x
1) = v(x
2). This implies that there exists v 2 R such that v(x) = v for
37Since h() is a strictly decreasing function, the inverse function g() exists.
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all x 2 [x ; x+]. Now, let x < x . Because (x ) = (x) = 0 and
R x+
x 
(z)dz = 1,
v(x)  v(x ) = 
Z x+
x 
(z   x )(z)dz  
Z x+
x 
(z   x  + x    x)(z)dz

(65)
= (x  x ) < 0: (66)
Similarly, we have v(x) < v(x+) for x > x+. Hence,  is an equilibrium.
Proof of Lemma 6. Suppose that the region is given by [0; L] where L is larger than
the length of the equilibrium support of the continuous-space model over R. Let nK be a
full-support distribution in the discrete-space model with K cells. Then, let
K(x) =
nKi
Ki
for x 2 [bKi 1; bKi ) (67)
where i 2 S and K(x) = 0 otherwise. For each j 2 S, let xKj be the middle point of
[bKj 1; b
K
j ] at which the discrete model's payo in cell j is dened. Then,
vK (x
K
i ) = Y   
Z
jxKi   yjK(y)dy + h(K(xKi )) (68)
= Y   
KX
j=1
Z bKj
bKj 1
jxKi   yj
nKj
Kj
dy + h(nKi =
K
i ) (69)
= Y   
i 1X
j=1
Z bKj
bKj 1
(xKi   y)
nKj
Kj
dy + 
KX
j=i+1
Z bKj
bKj 1
(xKi   y)
nKj
Kj
dy (70)
  
Z bKi
bKi 1
jxKi   yj
nKi
Ki
dy + h(nKi =
K
i ): (71)
We haveZ bKj
bKj 1
(xKi   y)
nKj
Kj
dy = nKj x
K
i  
nKj
Kj
(bKj )
2   (bKj 1)2
2
(72)
= nKj
 
xKi  
bKj + b
K
j 1
2
!
(73)
= nKj
 
xKi   xKj

* bKj = xKj +
Kj
2
; bKj 1 = x
K
j  
Kj
2
; (74)
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for j 2 S n fig. Moreover, since xKi is the middle point of [bKi 1; bKi ],Z bKi
bKi 1
jxKi   yj
nKi
Ki
dy = 2
Z xKi
bKi 1
(xKi   y)
nKi
Ki
dy
= 2nKi

1
2
xKi  
xKi + b
K
i 1
4

* bKi 1 = xKi  
Ki
2
=
1
2
nKi (x
K
i   bKi 1) =
1
4
nKi 
K
i
Hence,
KX
j=1
Z bKj
bKj 1
jxKi   yj
nKj
Kj
dy =
KX
j=1
jxKi   xKj jnKj +
1
4
nKi 
K
i : (75)
Therefore,
vK (x
K
i ) = vi(n
K)  
4
nKi 
K
i : (76)
Let z 2 [0; L]. For each K, there exists iKz 2 f1; 2; :::; Kg such that z 2 [bKiKz  1; bKiKz ).
Then, we have
vK (x
K
iKz
)   jxKiKz   zj  vK (z)  vK (xKiKz ) +  jxKiKz   zj (77)
, viKz (nK) 

4
nKiKz 
K
iKz
   jxKiKz   zj  vK (z)  viKz (nK) 

4
nKiKz 
K
iKz
+  jxKiKz   zj; (78)
where we use the triangle inequality for (77); and (76) for (78).
Suppose that, for any K  1, there exists K  K such that nK is an equilibrium. Then,
we can take a sequence fK`g`2N such that nK` is an equilibrium for all `.38 Then, in light of
(78), we have
v1(n
K`)  
4
nK`
i
K`
z
K`
i
K`
z
   jxK`
i
K`
z
  zj  vK` (z)  v1(nK`) 

4
nK`
i
K`
z
K`
i
K`
z
+  jxK`
i
K`
z
  zj (79)
, vK` (xK`1 ) +

4
(K`1 n
K`
1   nK`iK`z 
K`
i
K`
z
)   jxK`
i
K`
z
  zj
 vK` (z)  vK` (xK`1 ) +

4
(K`1 n
K`
1   nK`iK`z 
K`
i
K`
z
) +  jxK`
i
K`
z
  zj; (80)
where we use the equilibrium condition of nK` for (79); and (76) for (80). Since K`i vanishes
for all i when ` ! 1, whereas nK` is nite for any `, K`1 nK`1   nK`iK`z 
K`
i
K`
z
! 0 as ` ! 1.
Moreover, since xK`1 = 
K`
1 =2, lim`!1 vK` (x
K`
1 ) = v(0) where  = lim`!1 
K` . Then, since
xK`
i
K`
z
! z as ` ! 1, (80) implies v(z) = v(0). Since z 2 [0; L] is arbitrary, we have
obtained a spatial equilibrium  of the continuous-space model with support [0; L], but this
38There exists K1  1 such that nK1 is an equilibrium. This, in turn, enables us to take K2  K1 + 1
such that nK2 is an equilibrium. Continuing in this way, we obtain the desired sequence.
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is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Let fnKg be a sequence of discrete-space models' equilibria with
supp (nK) = fiK  ; iK  +1;    ; iK+   1; iK+g. Since the length of the equilibrium support of the
continuous-space model is assumed to be less than one, we have either limK!1 xiK  > 0 or
limK! 1 xiK+ < 1 (or both) by Lemma 6. Without loss of generality, suppose limK!1 xiK  >
0. Let  be the solution to the system (40a)-(40c) where x  = limK!1 xiK  . By Taylor's
theorem, if i 2 supp (nK) and (xi) > 0 so that  is dierentiable, H(xi) is expressed as
H(xi) = H(xi 1) + Ki
dH(xi 1)
dx
+
(Ki )
2
2
d2H(xi 1 + iKi )
dx2
; (81)
where i 2 (0; 1). Thus, by (41a) and Lemma 5, H(xi) HKi is given by
H(xi) HKi = H(xi 1) HKi 1 + Ki Ki +
(Ki )
2
2
d2H(xi 1 + iKi )
dx2
; (82)
where Ki = 2
nR xi 1
x 
g(H(z))dz  Pi 1j=iK  g(HKj )Kj o. Furthermore, Taylor's theorem yieldsZ bKi
bKi 1
g(H(z))dz =
Z bKi
x 
g(H(y))dy  
Z bKi 1
x 
g(H(y))dy
=
Z xi
x 
g(H(y))dy + 
K
i
2
g(H(xi)) +
(
Ki
2
)2
2
dg(H(xi + i 
K
i
2
))
dx
 
Z xi
x 
g(H(y))dy + 
K
i
2
g(H(xi)) 
(  Ki
2
)2
2
dg(H(xi    i 
K
i
2
))
dx
= Ki g(H(xi)) +
(Ki )
2
8
(
dg(H(xi + i 
K
i
2
))
dx
  dg(H(xi    i
Ki
2
))
dx
)
; (83)
where i 2 (0; 1) and  i 2 (0; 1). Therefore, we have
Ki = 2
24 i 1X
j=iK 

g(H(xj))  g(HKj )
	
Kj  
Z bKi 1
xi 1
g(H(z))dz  
Z x 
bK
iK  1
g(H(z))dz +mKi 1
35 ;
(84)
where
mKi =
iX
j=iK 
(Kj )
2
8
(
dg(H(xj + jKj =2))
dx
  dg(H(xj    j
K
j =2))
dx
)
: (85)
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By Lemma A1,
d2H(xi 1+iKi )dx2   2g0 where g0 is a bound of g(H(x)). Hence,
jH(xi) HKi j  jH(xi 1) HKi 1j+ Ki jKi j+ g0(Ki )2: (86)
We also have
dg(H(x))dx   g1 for some g1 > 0 by Lemma A1. Hence,
jmKi j 
g1
4
iX
j=iK 
(Kj )
2  g1
4
K
iX
j=iK 
Kj 
g1
4
K ;
where K = maxi2S Ki . Then,
1
2
jKi j 
i 1X
j=iK 
jg(H(xj))  g(HKj )jKj +
g0
K
i 1
2
+ g0jx    bKiK  1j+
g1
4
K

i 1X
j=iK 
jg(H(xj))  g(HKj )jKj + g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K
where the last inequality follows from
jx    bKiK  1j  jx    xiK  j+ jxiK    b
K
iK  1j = jx    xiK  j+
K
iK 
2
;
and K
iK 
; K
iK  1
 K . Therefore,
H(xi) HKi   H(xi 1) HKi 1+ 2Ki i 1X
j=iK 
jg(H(xj))  g(HKj )jKj
+ 2Ki

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
i
2

: (87)
In addition, since g is continuously dierentiable (and hence Lipschitz continuous), there
exists C 2 (0;1) such that jg(H(xi))  g(HKi )j  CjH(xi) HKi j. Thus, we obtain
H(xi) HKi   H(xi 1) HKi 1+ 2CKi i 1X
j=iK 
jH(xj) HKj jKj
+ 2Ki

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
i
2

: (88)
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Then, we consider the following dierence equation: for i 2 supp (nK) n fiK g,
XKi = X
K
i 1 + 2C
KK
i 1X
j=iK 
XKj + 2
K

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
2

; (89)
and XK
iK 
= jH(xiK  ) HKiK  j where 
K = maxi2S Ki . By induction, Xi  jH(xi) HKi j for all
i 2 supp (nK). Hence, it suces to show that, for all i 2 supp (nK), XKi converges to zero
as K !1.
Since limK!1KK < 1, KK  KK   for some  2 (0;1) (c.f., Ki = 
K
i +
K
i 1
2
).
Then, by XKi+1 > X
K
i , we have
XKi  (1 + 2CK)XKi 1 + 2K

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
2

 (1 + 2CK)i iK XKiK   
1  (1 + 2CK)i iK 
C

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
2



1 +
2C
K
K 
XKiK 
+
1
C

g0jx    xiK  j+

g0 +
g1
4

K +
g0
K
2

: (90)
Then, because K ! 0; "K ! 0; jx   xiK  j ! 0, and

1 + 2C

K
K
! e2C <1 as K !1,
we obtain
lim
K!1
XKi = 0 8i 2 supp (nK) if lim
K!1
XKiK 
= 0: (91)
Because x  > 0 by supposition, for suciently large K, xiK  1 > 0 for which 
K
iK  1
= 0.
Since (x ) = 0, we have HKiK  1 = H(x ), and thus
lim
K!1
XKiK 
 lim
K!1
h
jH(xiK  ) H(x )j+ jHKiK  1  H
K
iK 
j
i
 lim
K!1
KiK  1 = 0: (92)
This and (91) yield the desired conclusion.
Lemma A1 Let H(x) = h((x)) where  is an equilibrium such that supp () = (x ; x+).
Then, under Assumption 2 and the linear interaction cost, g(H(x)); dg(H(x))
dx
, and d
2H(x)
dx2
are
bounded over [x ; x+].
Proof. It follows from Corollary 1 of Blanchet et al. (2016) that g(H(x)) = (x) is continu-
ous in x at the equilibrium. In addition, g(H(x)) satises the population constraint. Thus,
g(H(x)) is bounded. Moreover, since dh((x))
dx
= h0((x))d(x)
dx
and it follows from (60) [resp.
Assumption 2] that dh((x))
dx
[resp. h0((x))] is continuous, d(x)
dx
is continuous. Hence, dg(H(x))
dx
35
is bounded over [x ; x+]. Furthermore, dierentiating (40a) with respect to x, we obtain
d2H(x)
dx2
= 2g(H(x)) 8x 2 [x ; x+]: (93)
This shows that d
2H(x)
dx2
is bound over [x ; x+].
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